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China and Oil in
the Asian Pacific
Region

Rising
Demand
for Oil

Pablo Bustelo
China’s growing demand for oil is significantly changing the international
geopolitics of energy, especially in the Asian Pacific region. The recent
growth in oil consumption, combined with forecasts of increased oil imports
(especially from the Middle East), have led to deep concern among Chinese
leaders regarding their country’s energy security. They are responding in a
number of different ways. In particular, they are searching for new sources
of supply and seeking to control purchases and transport lanes, while
boosting national production at any cost. This is already causing tension
with the United States and other big oil consumers, such as Japan and
India, as well as with other Asian Pacific countries. Enhanced cooperation
among the big East Asian economies (China, Japan, and South Korea),
however, is also a possibility.
This document presents an overview of China’s energy sector,
emphasising the strong growth in its energy demand to date and its potential for future growth. Secondly, we look at the oil sector, highlighting
China’s growing dependence on imports. The third part deals with the
Chinese perception of energy security in the oil sector. Finally, the fourth
part focuses on the geopolitical implications for the Asian Pacific region of
China’s search for oil.

China’s quest for energy security is more than simple economics. It is
about China’s overall development strategy; the direction of China’s
modernization program; what kind of China is emerging as a world
power; and ultimately it is about whether China will be a responsible
leader in protecting the global environment.1

Pablo Bustelo is the senior analyst (Asia-Pacific region) at the Elcano Royal Institute
and professor of Applied Economics at Complutense University of Madrid. The
report, written in September 2005, is reprinted here with permission and can be found
at www.realinstitutoelcano.org/documentos/226.asp. These pages do not contain the
full text (some tables and figures have been omitted) but numbering of the footnotes
remains as in the original.
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C

hina’s strong economic growth in recent years has led to a very
significant increase in its oil consumption. For example, oil demand
doubled between 1995 and 2005, reaching 6.8 million barrels per day (bbl/
d). China has been consuming more oil than Japan since 2003, the year it
became the world’s second biggest consumer. In 2004, China consumed 6.6
million bbl/d, still only a third of U.S. consumption (20.5 million bbl/d), but
nonetheless a 16 percent increase over the previous year (five times more
than the corresponding figure for the world as a whole).
Since it became a net oil importer in 1993, China has greatly increased its
foreign purchases. In 2004, gross oil imports (crude and oil products) rose to
3.4 million bbl/d, representing more than half the country’s consumption. In
2000, imports accounted for barely 1.9 million bbl/d, equivalent to 38
percent of consumption.
Forecasts for the coming decades all point to strong growth in demand
and, above all, a great increase in oil imports. Consumption could reach 12
million bbl/d in 2020 and 16 million bbl/d in 2030, while imports could
increase even more quickly, reaching 7 million bbl/d in 2020 and 11 million
bbl/d in 2030. In short, according to the vast majority of forecasts, China
could more than double its consumption of crude and treble its oil imports
over the next quarter of a century. China could increase its oil consumption
by an average of about 4.5 percent a year over the next two decades, more
than doubling the same figure for the world as a whole and more than
quadrupling the consumption increases forecast for developed western
countries.
This rise in consumption and in oil imports will be the result of several
factors, including rapid GDP growth of about 6 to 7 percent a year over the
next two or three decades, compared with a rate of 9.5 percent between
1980 and 2004. Other important factors are the energy-intensive industrial
sector, a sharp increase in the number of vehicles on the country’s roads
(rising from 20 million in 2004 to at least 130 million in 2020), and the need
to reduce the relative weight in energy consumption of inefficient and
extremely polluting coal.
If Chinese oil imports increase from 4 million bbl/d today to 7 million
bbl/d in 2020, to 8 million bbl/d in 2025, and to 11 million bbl/d in 2030, the
global effects of such a rise will significantly affect both the availability and
the price of crude. China is already actively seeking oil (and natural gas)
beyond its borders. This search will undoubtedly accelerate in the coming
years, with the effect of altering the geopolitics of energy and oil in the
Asian Pacific region and around the world.
These geopolitical effects will be particularly intense because of China’s
growing concern regarding increasing U.S. hegemony in the Middle East
(the source of a projected 70 percent of China’s oil imports in 2025 —
double the current proportion) and the vulnerability of transported oil, most
of which reaches China by sea, through the straits of Hormuz and Malacca.
In particular, China intends to diversify its supply sources, importing more
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oil from Russia, Central Asia, West Africa, and Latin America, and doing
everything possible to secure transport lanes for its crude imports.
In the words of a leading specialist in international energy affairs:
Rapid energy growth in China is leading to dramatic impacts throughout
the world in terms of commodity markets and prices, and within China,
growing thirst for energy is creating a new sense of urgency and energy
insecurity. Indeed, the means by which Beijing chooses to deal with its
energy security will not only affect the Chinese economy, but the global
economy as well. China’s energy needs have global implications today, as
was witnessed last year through competition with Japan for imported oil
from Russia. Ultimately the US, China, and Japan will be vying for the
same Middle Eastern crude oil. Over the next two decades, China will
play a larger and larger role in the Middle East since the country is so
dependent on foreign oil imports, as well as Central Asia, West Africa, and
other parts of the world which could help meet China’s growing energy
requirements.2

China’s efforts to control and develop its oil supply will have a considerable impact on the geopolitics of energy in Asia and around the world.
China will also become a key and very active player in the international
geopolitics of energy. Its energy trade with producing countries will bring
with it a greater economic, political, and military influence in these countries, and its territorial claims in the East China and South China seas may
lead to conflict with some of its neighbours. The expansion of the naval
forces of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) could be considered an expression of China’s desire to protect the sea lanes it needs for transporting crude
from the Middle East and West Africa.
From the U.S. perspective, China’s energy policy creates several economic, environmental, and geostrategic challenges to Washington:
First, China’s long-term impact on global energy supplies needs to be
carefully analyzed, along with whether China’s current approach to energy
security is conducive to U.S. and other oil-importing countries’ long-term
energy strategies. Second, China’s heavy reliance on coal as an energy
source poses a tremendous challenge to both China and the world, as
much of this consumption involves unwashed coal and has lead to a surge
in air pollution and emissions of greenhouse gases. Lastly, to enhance its
energy security, China has entered into energy deals with a number of
countries of concern, including Iran and Sudan. These arrangements are
troubling, especially to the extent they might involve political accommodations and sales or other transfers of weapons and military technologies
to these nations. 3

This document deals briefly with all these issues. First, it provides an overview of the energy sector in China. Secondly, it deals with the oil sector. The
third part deals with the Chinese perception of energy security in the oil
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sector. Finally, the fourth part focuses on the geopolitical implications for
Asia of China’s search for oil.

Energy in China: A Voracious Appetite
China is the second largest energy consumer in the world, accounting for
13.6 percent of world consumption in 2004. Its energy consumption has
increased very sharply in recent years: between 2000 and 2004, consumption rose from 766 million tons of oil equivalent (Mtoe) to 1,386 Mtoe
(rising from 8.4 percent to 13.6 percent of world consumption), as shown in
Figure 1; annual growth in energy consumption averaged 16 percent from
2000 to 2004 — a period during which China was responsible for 54.2
percent of the increase in world energy consumption.
Figure 1
Energy consumption in China, 1965–2004 (million tons of oil equivalent and
percentage of world consumption)
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The main reasons for the increase in energy demand have been the proliferation of factories, housing, and office buildings (greatly increasing the
demand for electricity, which has even been rationed in recent years), as
well as the sharp increase in road transport.4 The combination of an industrial structure that devours raw materials5 and rapidly increasing sales of
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automobiles and household appliances have been responsible for a huge
increase in energy consumption.
Besides, highly energy-intensive sectors, such as steel, cement, aluminium,
and chemical products, have grown dramatically in recent years. Growing
urbanization and a higher standard of living have increased the use of
heating, air conditioning, and automobiles.6 The growth in demand has been
especially felt as a result of the three-year moratorium on new investment in
the energy sector that the government imposed in 1999, in the wake of the
Asian financial crisis.7
For different reasons (low per capita consumption at present, predictions
of strong GDP growth, a sharp increase in the number of registered vehicles, the creation of a strategic oil reserve, etc.), consumption is expected
to continue increasing very fast: the IEA (2004) estimates that China will
consume 2,100 Mtoe in 2020 (more than western Europe that year) and
2,500 Mtoe in 2030 (nearly as much as current consumption in the United
States and Canada combined).
Per capita energy consumption stood in 2004 at 1.1 tons of oil equivalent
(toe) in China, 4.0 toe in Japan and Germany, 4.3 toe in France, and 7.9 toe
in the United States. This means that China consumes, on a per capita basis,
four times less than Japan, Germany, or France, and seven times less than
the United States.
Chinese GDP growth forecasts generally range from 6 to 7 percent a
year over the next two decades:
• According to the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2004): 8.4
percent in 1971–2002, 6.4 percent in 2002–10, 4.9 percent in 2010–
20 and 4.0 percent in 2020–30.
• According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA,
2005): 6.2 percent in 2001–25 in the basic scenario (with a possible
high of 7.0 percent and a low of 5.3 percent).
• According to the Institute of Energy Economics of Japan (IEEJ,
2004): 7.2 percent in 2000–20 (vs. 2.7 percent for the world as a
whole).
Concerning automobiles (cars and trucks), there are some estimates that the
20 million vehicles registered in 2004 will rise to 60 million in 2010, 80–100
million in 2015, and 130–65 million in 2020. In 2004, transportation accounted for 33 percent of oil consumption and this could rise to 57 percent
by 2020.8
Finally, the government decided in 2004 to progressively build a strategic
energy reserve, with the intention of stockpiling thirty-five days’ imports or
100 million barrels by 2008, 50 days’ imports or 300 million barrels by
2015, and ninety days’ imports or 600 million barrels by 2020.9
In the shorter term, Crompton and Wuredict10 that energy consumption
will rise to 1,521.4 Mtoe in 2010, with an annual growth rate of 3.8 percent
(a good deal lower than the 5.6 percent registered between 1980 and 1996,
the year before the Asian crises).
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According to estimates from Exxon Mobil,11 between 2004 and 2030 energy
demand will double in China, while it will grow by 50 percent in the world
and 18 percent in Europe (Chart 1). Only India will see a greater increase in
demand (164 percent), but it will reach a much lower level than China (29
million barrels a day of oil equivalent vs. 52 million).
Chart 1
World Energy Demand, 2004 and 2030 (in equivalent and percentages)
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Figure 2
Oil consumption and production in China, 1965–2004 (thousand bbl/d)
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Increased energy production will not be suddicient, since although China is
self-sufficient in coal and natural gas,12 it is not self-sufficient in oil (Figs
2,3,4). Although coal supplies nearly 70 percent of primary energy consumption in China, the relative weight of oil has increased significantly in
recent years, though remaining well below corresponding levels in other
Asian countries. (Chart 2)

Figure 3
Natural Gas Consumption and production in China, 1970–2004 (Mtoe)
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Chart 2
Distribution of primary energy consumption by source,
1991 and 2004 (in percentages)
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China’s energy sector will have to face up to various challenges in the
coming years:13
• In the short term, enhanced coordination and management of the
energy supply is necessary. China has large oil and gas reserves, but
these are mainly in the northeast of the country, far from the major
consumption centers on the south and east coasts. Energy transportation infrastructures are inadequate and still not well enough
developed.
• In the medium term, energy efficiency must be improved. Since
energy consumption has grown more quickly than GDP in recent
years, energy intensity, measured as the amount of energy per unit
of GDP — which had fallen in the 1980s and most of the 1990s —
has stabilized and even begun to climb slightly in the early years of
this decade (Figure 5).14 Reducing dependence on coal is also necessary.
• In the long term, China must formulate a coherent energy policy that
allows it to efficiently manage energy supply and demand, as well as
the very significant environmental impact of energy production and
consumption. Since coal will continue to be the major energy source
and since coal consumption will increase substantially, CO2 emissions will reach 8.13 billion tons in 2025 (21 percent of world emissions), compared to 3.32 billion tons registered in 2002 (14 percent
of world emissions), according to EIA forecasts (2005). Of these 8.1
billion tons, 5.8 billion come from coal consumption.15
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Figure 5. Energy intensity in China (kg of oil equivalent per thousand years of GDP
at 1995 prices), 1979-2004)
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Oil in China: a Growing Dependence on Imports
China became the second biggest world consumer of oil in 2003, the year it
overtook Japan (Figure 6). Only a third of its oil consumption is used for
transportation, meaning that China has still not reached the world average
(48 percent).
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Figure 6
Oil Consumption in China, Japan and the United States 1990–2004
(million bbl/d)
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The country has seen a sharp rise in consumption, which doubled between
1984 (1.7 million bbl/d) and 1995 (3.4 million bbl/d), and again between
1995 and 2005 (6.8 million bbl/d); between 2000 and 2004 it rose from 4.9
to 6.6 million bbl/d, or from 6.6 percent to 8.3 percent of world consumption; between 1994 and 2004 average annual consumption grew by 7.8
percent. China was responsible for 34 percent of the increase in world oil
consumption between 2000 and 2004 (and 63 percent in 2000 and 44
percent in 2002, as can be seen in Chart 3).
Increased Chinese demand has therefore been one of the factors in the
sharp increases in oil prices, which, as is well known, doubled between mid2003 and mid-2005.16
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Chart 3
Increase in World and Chinese Oil Demand, 1994–2004*
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Among the causes of the recent rise in China’s oil demand are strong
GDP growth, the increasing number of registered vehicles, the use of fuel oil
and diesel to generate electricity in order to overcome shortages,17 the trend
toward replacing coal with oil and gas. Between 1994 and 2004, GDP grew
at an annual average rate of 8.4 percent. Automobile sales in the domestic
market, which stood at less than 250,000 units in 1999, reached more than
two million units in 2003. Although installed electricity capacity had increased from 100 gigawatts in 1987 to 425 gigawatts in 2004, China had
power shortages that year in 24 of its 31 provinces and autonomous regions, with frequent outages in some cities.18 The weight of oil in primary
energy consumption rose from 19 percent in 1995 to 22 percent in 2004,
while coal dropped from 77 percent to 69 percent.
Growth forecasts suggest that between 2002 and 2025 oil consumption
will increase at an average annual rate of 4.5 percent in China (3.5 percent
in India, 1.4 percent in the United States, 0 percent in Japan, 1.3 percent in
South Korea and 1.9 percent in the world), according to the EIA.19 Figure 7
compares predicted consumption trends in several countries. China will
increase its consumption greatly, among other reasons,20 because it needs to
reduce its dependence on coal, which has low energy efficiency and is
extremely polluting, as we see in Chart 4. The proportion of oil as a primary
energy source will rise from 22 percent in 2004 to 29 percent in 2020, while
coal will drop from 69 percent to 56 percent, according to IEEJ forecasts.21
The number of vehicles in China will also increase greatly. Goldman Sachs22
estimates that it will rise from 19.2 million in 2005 to 42.5 million in 2010,
to 131.6 million in 2020, and to 198.8 million in 2030, overtaking the number of automobiles in the United States between 2020 and 2025.23 Another
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Figure 7
Projected trends in oil consumption in several countries, 2005-2025 (million bbl/d)
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Chart 4
Indicators of energy efficiency and carbon dioxide emissions, 2000
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factor in the growing demand for oil will be the increase in the strategic
reserve, which was initiated in 2005 in four locations in Zhejiang,
Shandong, and Liaoning provinces. Reserves will rise from 100 million
barrels in 2008 to over 600 million barrels in 2020.
Chart 5 [omitted in this printing], shows that projected oil demand varies
according to the main studies carried out (IEA, 2004, EIA, 2004 and 2005,
and IEEJ, 2004, among others). In general, estimates made in 2004 suggested that oil demand could reach 7.5 million bbl/d in 2010, 11 million bbl/d
in 2020, and 13 million bbl/d in 2030. The EIA (2005) estimates 9 million
bbl/d in 2010, 12 million bbl/d in 2020 and, applying a growth rate of 3.9
percent in 2025–30 (the same as in 2020–25), 16.4 million bbl/d in 2030.
The only clearly differing forecasts are by Goldman Sachs (2004), whose
estimates are significantly higher than average, and the DRC (2003), which
projects figures that are much lower than average. This is because Goldman
Sachs expects GDP growth with a higher energy intensity than in other
estimates. By contrast, the estimates made in 2003 by the Development
Research Center (DRC) of the Chinese State Council have already been
outstripped by actual events: consumption in 2004 (6.6 million bbl/d) was
actually greater than that the forecast for 2010.
The lowest estimates for 2010 (around 7.5 million bbl/d) seem too cautious in any case. In fact, consumption could well exceed 7.5 million bbl/d as
early as 2007.29 Supposing that oil consumption grows at an average annual
rate of 4 percent in 2004–10 (it was 7.6 percent in 2000–04), the 2010
figure would be 8.4 million bbl/d. Even a rate of 3.5 percent would result in
8.1 million bbl/d.
If IEA estimates (2004) for China’s consumption in 2030 (12.8 million bbl/
d) and world consumption in that year (121 million bbl/d) are accurate,
China’s share of world oil consumption will rise from 8 percent in 2004 to
11 percent in 2030. If EIA estimates (2005) for Chinese consumption in 2025
(14.2 million bbl/d) and world consumption (119.2 million bbl/d) are accurate, China’s share will reach 12 percent in 2025.
On the supply side, China was the world’s sixth largest producer in 2004,
with 3.5 million bbl/d (behind Iran and Mexico, and ahead of Norway and
Canada) and a long way behind the three main producers (Saudi Arabia,
Russia, and the United States). BP (2005) estimates China’s reserves at 17.1
billion barrels (1.4 percent of world reserves). Thus, unlike other Asian
countries (Japan, South Korea and even India), China has significant production and reserves.30
In recent years, production has grown slowly: between 2000 and 2004
production grew from 3.3 million bbl/d to 3.5 million bbl/d, an annual
average growth rate of 1.8 percent (while consumption went up 7.6 percent); China was responsible for barely 4.5 percent of the growth in world
production between 2000 and 2004.
Regarding the forecasts of production for the next decades, they suggest
a maximum of 3.7 million bbl/d in 2010, followed by a gradual decline to 3.5
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million bbl/d in 2025,31 as we see in Figure 8 [omitted in this publication].
Although China is an important producer and will remain one, its main
fields (Daqing, Shengli, and Diaohe, in the northeast) are now old and
beginning to run out, while its offshore projects (in the East China Sea, the
Gulf of Bohai, the mouth of the Pearl river and the South China Sea) are
small.32 Production gains seem most likely in the western province of
Xinjiang, where authorities expect that 1 million bbl/d will be produced
starting in 2008.33 [Figure 8 is omitted.]
Figure 9
Chinese oil comsumption and imports to China, 2004-30 (millions bbdd and percent)
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The IEEJ (2004) forecasts net imports of 3.5 million bbl/d (52 percent consumption) in 2010
and 9.0 million bbl/d (75 percent) in 2020. The EIA (2004) forecasts gross imports of 8.6
million bbl/d in 2025 (with consumption of 12.8 million bbl/d, for a import share of 67
percent). The EIA (2005) 36 forecasts imports of 10.7 million bbl/d in 2025 (75 percent of
consumption).

Chinese Energy Security in the Oil Sector:
A Serious Concern
In the late nineties, an IEA (2000) study noted that the growing demand for
oil and China’s ever-increasing crude imports would have serious strategic
implications, especially in terms of the country’s relations with the Middle
East, central Asia, Russia, and the rest of East Asia.
Since then, the growing dependence on oil imports has created an increasing sense of “energy insecurity”37among Chinese leaders.38 There is even
concern that eventual supply shortages or sharp increases in crude prices
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could endanger economic expansion, job creation, and social peace. Some
Chinese analysts even refer to the possibility that the United States is
practicing an “energy containment” policy toward China, or could implement one in the future. Chinese leaders tend to believe that dependence on
imported oil leads to great “strategic vulnerability.39 Moreover, the military
intervention in Iraq by the United States and its allies since 2003 has endangered Chinese investments made in the oil sector during the Saddam
Hussein regime. The war in Iraq and growing U.S. hegemony in the Middle
East have made even more urgent for China to reduce its dependence on the
Persian Gulf.
In late 2004, it became known that Russia had decided to give priority to
the construction of the Tayshet-Skovorodino-Nakhodka oil pipeline (the
route preferred by Japan, running from eastern Siberia to Perevoznaya Bay,
in the Pacific) over the 2,300-kilometre Angarsk-Daqing route (preferred by
China), running from the south of Lake Baikal to the main Chinese distribution center in the northeastern province of Heilongjiang. In 2003, the
Chinese company CNPC and the Russian company Yukos signed an agreement for the Angarsk-Daqing pipeline, but the difficulties that Yukos suffered in Russia afterwards, combined with a Japanese counter offer, eventually led to the Russian company Transneft deciding to begin construction on
the Tayshet-Nakhodka route.40 In the end, to compensate China, President
Putin announced in July 2005 that Russia would give Beijing priority in
railway transport of oil from Skovorodino41 until the pipeline to the Pacific
is finished around 2010, and the Skovorodino-Daqing branch is built by
about 2020.
Furthermore, the U.S. military presence in several central Asian countries
since 2002 (with air bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan) has been considered a risk to the future Atasu-Alanshankou pipeline between Kazakhstan
and the Chinese region of Xinjiang. This pipeline would also connect China
with the rest of the east coast of the Caspian Sea (with the already existing
pipeline from Charjou, in Turkmenistan, to Atasu). This route could be as
open to risk of U.S. intervention (for example, a blockade in the case of
armed conflict with Taiwan) as the sea lanes from the Persian Gulf.42 In any
case, as of 2006, Russian and Kazakh pipelines together will carry only
about 30 million tons a year — barely 15 percent of Chinese imports — and
thus will not have a significant impact on the growing dependence on the
Middle East.43
Chinese leaders tend to believe that competition for oil is a long-term zero
sum game with the United States. They also believe that, if clear “containment” mechanisms were to be implemented, Washington would do everything in its hand to reduce China’s access to imported oil.44
China’s foreign and security policy has reflected these fears (AndrewsSpeed 45 et al., 2002, Dannreuther, 2003, Downs, 2004, and Meidan, 2004):
rapprochement with central Asian countries and Russia, a firmer stance on
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territorial claims in the South and East China seas, naval development, in
part to protect maritime oil supply lanes,46 etc.
Among the measures related strictly to energy issues and included in the
tenth Five-Year Plan (2001–05) and in the project of eleventh Five-Year Plan
(2006–10), the government has emphasized containing energy demand
through saving and conservation energy, while at the same time increasing
energy efficiency, developing new types of energy (nuclear, hydroelectric,
and others), increasing the security and reliability of imports, exploiting
national resources more efficiently, creating a vast oil and gas transport
system, and opening up the energy sector to private investment.47 These
measures are clearly an essential part of Chinese energy security policy.48
Regarding the security and reliability of oil imports, China has been
looking for new supply sources (in an attempt to diversify the risk inherent
in over-dependence on the Middle East) and is trying to gain greater control
over imports and transport routes.
To find these new supply sources, China has sought closer ties with
countries that had little or no importance as suppliers in the 1990s (Russia,
Kazakhstan, Canada, Australia, Sudan, Tunisia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Peru,
Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela, among others), through trade agreements
or by acquiring stakes in foreign companies.49 This process got underway in
the late nineties, with incipient relations with the Middle East in general,
central Asia, Russia, Africa, Latin America, and North America. Three
stages can be distinguished in the international acquisitions policy of the
three main state-owned Chinese companies (China National Petroleum
Corporation, CNPC; China National Offshore Oil Corporation, CNOOC;
and China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation, Sinopec):
• The first stage (1992–95) was exploratory and consisted of experi
mental acquisitions in Thailand, Canada, Indonesia, Peru, and
Sudan.
• The second stage (1997–2002) saw acquisitions in Sudan, Venezuela,
Iraq, and Kazakhstan, and to a lesser extent in Algeria, Azerbaijan,
Chad, Ecuador, Indonesia (with the purchase of the subsidiary of
Repsol YPF in 2002), Iran, Myanmar, Niger, Oman, Uzbekistan,
Russia, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkmenistan.
• The third stage, since the U.S. military intervention in Iraq, has
involved an accelerated acquisitions policy in: Algeria, Gabon,
Egypt, Brazil, Argentina, Iran, Venezuela, and Canada, among
others.50
Among recent major agreements, the most noteworthy have been with
Teheran (November 2004) for the exploration and development of the
Yadavaran oil field in Iran by the Sinopec corporation, and with Caracas
(December 2004) for the operation of fifteen fields in eastern Venezuela.
The most important recent purchases include one in August 2005 by CNPC,
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which took over the Canadian oil company PetroKazakhstan, for 4.18
billion dollars, beating the offer made by the Indian ONGC-Mittal group.51
One of the results of this international expansion has been that, in the
nineties and the early years of this decade, China has begun to diversify its
supply sources geographically. As we can see in Figure 10, Chinese imports
in the mid-nineties came mainly from the Asian Pacific region and Oman,
while in 2001 the Asia Pacific share dropped in favor of Africa and other
Middle Eastern countries. In 2003, the five main suppliers were Saudi
Arabia, Iran, Angola, Oman, and Yemen.52
The flip side of this coin is that the United States has been suspicious of
this policy of acquiring foreign interests.
China’s closer ties (for energy-related reasons) to countries such as Iran,
Sudan, Myanmar, Uzbekistan, Russia, Argentina, Canada, and Venezuela is
of great concern to the Americans, since it means a significant and potentially hostile political presence in conflictive regions and places where
Washington has until now enjoyed exclusive influence.53China has also
taken advantage of cooler relations between the United States and Saudi
Arabia to launch a diplomatic offensive aimed at developing closer ties with
Riyadh.54 In other words, China has successfully used the windows of
opportunity that it has found open in recent years.
Some U.S. analysts believe that China’s agreements with Iran and Sudan
include arms transfers or an implicit veto against possible sanctions by the
United Nations Security Council (on the Iranian nuclear program or the
Darfur massacres).55
Further recent evidence that energy-related competition between Beijing
and Washington has become a sensitive issue was the attempt by CNOOC
to buy the U.S. oil corporation Unocal in 2005. This attempt ultimately
failed when the Chinese company withdrew in the face of the “rarified
political climate” in the United States as a result of its offer. As is wellknown, in early July, the U.S. congress passed a resolution opposing the
CNOOC offer for reasons of “national security.”
China’s acquisitions policy has also been costly. Chinese companies have
not hesitated to make significantly higher bids than their rivals. In general,
concessions have been gained at very high prices.56 The three main Chinese
oil companies have high acquisitions budgets due to the large profits obtained through high crude prices since they first went public in 2000 in New
York and Hong Kong, and also due to government subsidies.
Finally, it is not clear that the international expansion policy contributes
significantly to the country’s energy security.57 Foreign oil production is not
sufficient to satisfy rapidly growing demand,58 while it generates oil that is
not necessarily cheaper than the one Beijing could find on the international
market. In fact, China’s foreign acquisitions may be primarily focused on
another long-term goal: controlling oil at its source in order to influence
prices not only as a strategic consumer, but also as a global producer.59
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Figure 10
Geographic distribution of Chinese oil imports, 1991-2001
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At another level, China is attempting to gain greater control over oil
imports and supply routes. For example, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), made up of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, clearly has a component that involves energy, as
well as security.60 The Kazakhstan-China pipeline is scheduled to be completed in December 2005 and Beijing wants to complement it with a pipeline
running in the same direction. At the SCO summit in Astana, the capital of
Kazakhstan, in 2005, Iran, Pakistan, and India participated as observers.
There is a proposal on the table for a pipeline from Iran to India, passing
through Pakistan, and China would like to see it extended to the Chinese
border. In 2005, Beijing also signed a joint exploration agreement with
Uzbekistan.
The free trade area to be formed by China and the ASEAN countries in
2010 also partly reflects Chinese interest in optimizing its access to Indonesian and Malaysian oil and gas, and to Singapore’s refining capacity.61
While searching for new supply sources and more efficiently controlling
imports, China is also doing its utmost to develop its domestic production.
This involves, among other things,62 extracting offshore resources in disputed border areas, including the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands (with Japan), the
Nansha/Spratly Island (with several countries in the region), and the Xisha/
Paracel islands (with Vietnam).
Regarding the energy transport network, a distinction must be made
between measures aimed at facilitating imports and initiatives to distribute
energy to consumer centers from import terminals or production centers:63
• Gas pipeline from Irkutsk to Korea and China (although Russia will
not be exporting gas from Irkutsk until 2010).
• Gas pipeline from Sakhalin to the Chinese province of Shenyang.
• Liquefied natural gas (LNG) import terminals in the southern provinces of Guangdong and Fujian, to receive LNG imported from
Australia and Indonesia starting in 2007.
• Oil pipeline from Kazakhstan to the Xinjiang region in China.
• Oil pipeline from Skovorodino to Daqing.
• West-east electric transmission network (generated by coal and
hydroelectric power), with 100 GW projected in 2020.
• West-east gas pipeline (gas from Sichuan, Xinjiang and Shaanxi) to
Beijing and east and north-east coast cities.
• West-east oil pipeline (Shanshan–Lanzhou–Gansu).
Among the consequences of these measures, two stand out:64First, China’s
efforts to control and develop its oil supply will have a considerable impact
on the geopolitics of energy in Asia and around the world. And second,
China will become a key player in the geopolitics of international energy,
since its energy trade with producing countries will bring with it greater
economic, political and military influence in these countries. Until now,
these countries have been very marginal in China’s foreign policy, but they
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could become much more important, thus increasing the likelihood of
economic and political rivalry with Japan, the United States, and Russia in
producing regions.65

Oil Geopolitics in the Asian Pacific:
The Chinese Factor
Past and future increases in domestic demand for oil (and its impact on
imports), growing U.S. hegemony in the Middle East, and the vulnerability
of sea routes for transporting crude from the Middle East, have changed
Chinese perceptions of the international and Asian geopolitics of oil.
First of all, demand has increased very significantly and there is potential
for great further increases. As was noted above, Chinese oil consumption
between 1994 and 2004 rose from 3.1 to 6.6 million bbl/d, more than doubling, while world consumption increased by less than 20 percent. Also,
according to EIA estimates (2005), in 2025 China will consume 14.2 million
bbl/d (12 percent of world consumption) and will import 10.7 million bbl/d
of this amount. The IEA estimates (2004) that oil imports could reach 11
million bbl/d in 2030, representing 85 percent of domestic consumption.
Second, growing U.S. hegemony in the Middle East is a factor of concern
to Chinese leaders. On one hand, the Middle East holds more than 60
percent of proven oil reserves (though it contributed less than a third of
world production in 2004, as Chart 6 shows) and is the source of 37 percent
of China’s oil imports (Figure 11). Also, some estimates indicate that the
Middle East’s share of world production could rise to 46 percent in 2030.66
In part because of this, and also because it is difficult and costly to transport
central Asian and Russian oil to China, the Middle East’s share in Chinese
imports could rise to 70 to 80 percent in 2015.67 For example, the EIA
(2004) estimates that imports will rise to 8.6 million bbl/d in 2025, of which
5.7 million bbl/d (69 percent) will come from the Persian Gulf and only 1.7
million bbl/d (20 percent) will come from the former Soviet countries.
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Chart 6
Proven oil reserves (million barrels, end of 2004) and oil production (million barrels a
day, 2004)
Reserves
Production
Country
mb
%
million bd
%
Saudi Arabia
Iran
Iraq
Kuwait
UAE
Rest of Middle East
Entire Middle East
Russia
Kazakhstan
China
USA
World

262,700
132,500
115,000
99,000
97,800
27,000
733,900
72,300
39,600
17,100
29,400
1,188,600

22.1
11.1
9.7
8.3
8.2
2.0
61.7
6.1
3.3
1.4
2.5
100.0

10,584
4,081
2,027
2,424
2,667
2,788
24,571
9,285
1,295
3,490
7,241
80,260

13.1
5.2
2.6
3.1
3.3
3.5
30.7
11.6
1.6
4.5
8.5
100.0

Source: BP (2005), 4.

Figure 11
Geographic distribution of Chinese and Japanese oil imports, 2004
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Japan: 5.2 million barrels per day
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China and other big Asian Pacific importers, such as Japan and South
Korea, will therefore be unable to avoid heavy dependence on the Middle
East. Since this dependence is detrimental to energy security, they will have
to do everything possible to mitigate it68 by developing supply sources in
Russia and central Asia, despite the logistic and financial difficulties involved in transporting oil from Siberia and the Caspian Sea to consumption
centers in northeast Asia.
In any case, there is a “geopolitical imperative” for China to establish
trade and political ties with the main producing countries in the Middle East
(Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq). Doing so comes at a high cost for Beijing,
since it will increase its economic dependence and its vulnerability to political turbulence in that part of the world.69 Dependence on the Middle East
poses serious problems for China: 1) This is a region subject to close surveillance by the United States, whose influence has increased since the occupation of Iraq; 2) It is a politically unstable region; 3) Transport from the
region via the straits of Hormuz and Malacca could be blocked by Washington if there were a serious bilateral dispute; 4) Competition for oil from
the Middle East is very intense on the part of the US, Japan, India, the EU
and others.70 Furthermore, the war in Iraq has been perceived as an attempt
by the United States to permanently increase its influence in the Middle
East. Whether or not Washington finally achieves this, it now has a foot
planted in the country with the world’s third largest reserves.
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Third, regarding the vulnerability of sea transport, it must be kept in
mind that 75 percent of Chinese oil imports pass through the Strait of
Malacca, which could be the object of terrorist attacks or even a blockade
by the U.S. navy (for example, in the case of armed conflict with Taiwan).
These three concerns have led China to create a strategic oil reserve and,
above all, to try to increase the diversification of its supply sources and
transport routes.71
The creation of a strategic oil reserve does not seem to worry the other
main consumer countries, as long as it is done gradually, given the serious
tension already existing in the world market. On the contrary, Japan and
western countries consider this highly necessary as a way to reduce the risk
of a Chinese energy crisis. Tokyo’s position is that the Japanese experience
after the oil shocks of the 1970s — when oil was stockpiled and measures
were put in place to reduce consumption — could serve as inspiration for
China.
By contrast, China’s attempt to increase and diversify its oil supply and
transport routes could lead to serious conflict with Japan and other Asian
countries, and even with Europe and the United States.72 The search for new
sources of oil in the East China Sea and the South China Sea creates conflict
with countries such as Japan or Vietnam (Daly, 2004). Investment in oil
exploration and production abroad are fueling various rivalries, as are
supply agreements with countries such as Iran, Russia, Kazakhstan and
Sudan.
Meanwhile, China is helping build new pipelines to transport oil from
Russia and Kazakhstan, and is looking into sea lanes that could be alternatives to the one through the Strait of Malacca.73 The pipelines now under
construction or scheduled to be built include the Russian pipeline from
Taishet (eastern Siberia) to Skovorodino and Nakhodka, which could be
extended from Skovorodino to Daqing, and the Kazakh/Chinese oil pipeline
from Atasu (Kazakhstan) to Alashankou, Dushanzi, and Lanzhou.
Regarding concerns about the chokepoint at the Strait of Malacca, there
are four main (sea and land) alternatives: (1) building a 250-km oil pipeline
or canal across the isthmus of Kra (Thailand) from the Andaman Sea to the
Gulf of Siam; (2) using the Sunda Strait (between Sumatra and Java); the
main problem, however, is that it is very shallow; (3) using the Lombok
Strait (east of Java) through the Makassar Strait; however, this route is
considerably longer and would raise the price per barrel by at least two
dollars; or 4) lay down an oil pipeline from Myanmar to China (from the
port of Sittwe in the Gulf of Bengal to Kunming in Yunnan province); this is
already underway, but it will not solve the problem of transport from
Yunnan to the provinces on the east and south coasts.
China’s intention to increase and diversify its oil supply sources and
transport routes is having geopolitical consequences in the Asian Pacific
region.74 There is a risk of conflict with its most important neighbors (Japan,
South Korea, and India), although there could also be cooperation on joint,
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coordinated access to resources,75 as the 2004 “Qingdao initiative,” for
instance, made clear.76
Regarding the likelihood of conflict, a specialist at the National Bureau of
Asian Research in Seattle wrote:
China’s increasingly mercantilist strategy to assert control of oil and
natural gas supplies and transport routes risks fueling tensions and conflict
in a region where the lack of regional institutions to manage conflict is
already a major problem and a region which is facing a sensitive transition to accommodate China’s rising power over the next two decades.
Energy competition is beginning to seriously aggravate existing and, in
some cases, deepening rivalries between China and her neighbors. 77

There is a risk of conflict:
(1) with Japan over resources in Russia, the East China Sea, and, to a
lesser extent, in central Asia.78 The Russian preference for the TaishetNakhodka oil pipeline has irritated China, which went so far as to temporarily suspend exports from Daqing to Japan. In the East China Sea, there
are two main areas of dispute: the Chun Xiao, Dunquiao, and Tianwaitan
offshore gas fields, very close to the border between the two countries;79
and the oil reserves near the Senkaku islands (which Chinese call Diaoyu),
occupied by Japan and claimed by China, with a possible 95 billion barrels
(Harrison, 2005).
(2) with Vietnam and other East Asian countries and territories over
resources in the South China Sea and the Gulf of Tonkin. The Paracel
islands are claimed by China, Vietnam, and Taiwan, while the Spratly
islands are claimed entirely by China, Vietnam, and Taiwan, and partially
by the Philippines, Brunei, Indonesia, and Malaysia.
China and the Philippines came to an agreement in 2003 on joint exploration in the South China Sea, which irritated Vietnam. Petro China, a subsidiary of CNPC, obtained exploration permits from the Chinese government
for several blocks of this sea, including some of the Spratly islands. For its
part, Petro Vietnam began accepting prospecting offers in disputed waters,
to Beijing’s chagrin. Hanoi asked China to stop its exploration in the Gulf of
Tonkin and finally, in mid-2005, China, the Philippines, and Vietnam agreed
to carry out joint prospecting in the South China Sea.
Although territorial claims in the South China Sea are less likely to lead to
disputes than in the past — especially since the signing of the Code of
Conduct in 2002, the rapprochement between Beijing and Hanoi in recent
years, and the tripartite accord of 2005 — energy interests in the Spratly
and Paracel islands could change the situation and eventually lead to conflict among the claimant countries.
(3) with India, since China wants a naval presence in the Indian Ocean
and has sought closer ties with Myanmar to accomplish this. The expansion
of the Chinese navy can be considered, at least in part, an expression of
Beijing’s desire to protect maritime oil supply lanes and, eventually, natural
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gas routes. Also, India’s growing consumption is forcing Indian companies
to compete with the Chinese for international agreements and investments
in countries such as Angola, Russia, and Kazakhstan.80
However, not all analysts consider conflict over energy resources to be
inevitable and some believe that, in fact, we may see enhanced cooperation
among east Asian countries.81
To begin with, the big countries in East and South Asia (China, India,
Japan and South Korea) all share similar interests: reducing their dependence on oil imports from the Middle East by geographically diversifying
their supply (to Russia or central Asia), while increasing the proportion of
natural gas in their primary energy consumption.
Meanwhile, all of them have a common interest in the political and
economic stability of the Middle East, which is — and will remain — an
essential source of oil for China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and other
east Asian economies.
The economies of Central Asia, Siberia, East Asia, and the Russian Far
East also complement each other in important ways: Central Asia and the
center and east of the Russian Federation have abundant energy resources,
Japan and South Korea can supply abundant financing,82 and China can
provide an abundant labor force and a huge, expanding market.
There are numerous problems with depending on Middle East oil: regional instability, long transport lanes vulnerable to piracy and terrorism,
and the existence of chokepoints (such as the straits of Hormuz and Malacca), among others.
Switching over to natural gas (and renewable energies) makes sense from
economic, geopolitical, and environmental perspectives:83 gas is more
efficient than other fossil fuels; the gas trade produces long-term agreements
between buyers and sellers, which foments international stability; and gas is
less polluting than other fossil fuels.84
There are also initiatives in which regional cooperation would make a
great deal of sense: joint construction of shared energy transportation
infrastructure (for example, oil pipelines from Siberia to the Pacific, gas
pipelines from Siberia to the Pacific or from Sakhalin to Japan, China, and
the Korean peninsula, financing for an oil pipeline connecting the Middle
East with central Asia, running south of the Caspian Sea); connecting Asian
countries to the Russian electrical system; creating a strategic oil reserve
for common use;85 and joint operations in disputed areas of the East China
Sea (Diaoyu islands) and the South China Sea (Spratly islands).
In short, “China’s needs for foreign energy supplies are more likely to
foster interdependence and regional and international integration, which
should strengthen cooperation and responsible Chinese behavior.”86
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Conclusions
China doubled its oil consumption between 1995 and 2005, while during the
same period world demand grew by 20 percent. Since 2003, China has been
consuming more oil than Japan and in 1993 it became a net importer. At
present, its foreign purchases account for more than half its consumption.
Somewhat more than a third of these imports are from the Middle East.
China will undoubtedly more than double its oil consumption and triple
its imports in the next twenty-five years. Growth factors include: China’s
still low per capita consumption, the strong projected increase in registered
automobiles (the number of which could rise tenfold, to 200 million units in
2030), its growing strategic reserve (initiated in 2005) and the need to
reduce the amount of (inefficient and very polluting) coal it uses as a proportion of its overall primary energy consumption. Imports will likely reach
60 percent of consumption in 2010 and 85 percent of demand in 2030. It is
also predicted that the Middle East will be the source of more than 70
percent of crude imports — double the current proportion.
The experience of recent years and the forecasts for the coming years
have created a sense of strategic vulnerability among Chinese leaders.
China’s reaction over the past decade has consisted, first of all, in trying to
increase the security and reliability of oil imports by searching for new
supply sources, and to control imports and transport routes, while also
boosting national oil production at any cost.
This double response has had — and will continue to have — significant
geopolitical consequences, especially in the Asia Pacific region. To limit the
problem of extreme (though inevitable to a large extent) dependence on the
Middle East, while at the same time guaranteeing supplies from that region,
China has used trade agreements and the acquisition of oil interests to
establish closer ties with several producer countries and regions: Russia,
Central Asia (especially Kazakhstan, but also Uzbekistan), Sudan, Iran,
Venezuela, and Myanmar, among others. This frenetic global search for oil,
which will surely continue in the coming years, could create conflicts with
other big importing countries (the United States, the European Union,
Japan, and India) and sometimes political tensions with the United States
(for example, over Sudan, Iran, and Venezuela).
The construction of oil and gas pipelines from Russian and central Asia
could also lead to conflict with Japan. The search for land and sea alternatives to the chokepoint formed by the Strait of Malacca (now the route for
three-quarters of China’s oil imports) could lead to a strategic rapprochement with Thailand, Myanmar, and Indonesia. Naval protection of lanes in
the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea could cause tension with India,
Vietnam, and the United States.
Moreover, the desire to increase national production at any cost has led –
and will continue to lead — China to take a firmer stance on territorial
issues, including its sovereignty in the East China Sea (especially the Diaoyu
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islands, known as the Senkaku islands to the Japanese) and in the South
China Sea (especially the Spratly islands). A stronger stance on this issue
could lead to major tension with Japan and other east Asian countries.
However, although it is true that there are several significant trends
toward heightened geopolitical tension in the Asia Pacific region as a result
of competition for oil, the possibility exists that the pragmatic countries of
the region may reach enhanced cooperation agreements on energy issues.
At the end of the day, China, Japan, South Korea, and even India all share
common interests, high among which is the desire to reduce their dependence on the Middle East and to proportionally increase their consumption
of natural gas.
It is still early to determine whether the Asia Pacific region is headed
toward an era of increasing rivalries or, on the contrary, toward an era of
greater cooperation on energy issues, particularly those involving the
consumption and importation of oil. In any case, a move toward one scenario or the other will largely depend on China’s strategic decisions in the
coming years.
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